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DAVID CABRELLI & MATHIAS SIEMS*
Convergence, Legal Origins, and Transplants in
Comparative Corporate Law: A Case-Based
and Quantitative Analysist
In this Article, the authors intend to fill a gap in the comparative
law literature by adopting a case-based approach to comparative cor-
porate law that highlights the important dimension of specific cases in
corporate law matters and how identifiable, but limited issues arising
from such case disputes are resolved in different jurisdictions. Our
study is based on ten cases used in a wider research project and their
solutions in ten countries: eight European countries, the United
States, and Japan. We assess the solutions to these cases using quanti-
tative methods of network and cluster analysis. We also seek to
enquire whether conceptual differences exist between the countries in
terms of the source, form, style, and substance of the legal rules which
comprise their corporate laws.
The findings of this assessment are used to evaluate arguments
developed in the academic comparative company literature which
posit that the existence of fundamental differences in the protection of
shareholders across countries reduces the scope for convergence in cor-
porate law systems. The case-based evaluation is also applied to make
a contribution towards other influential theories in comparative law,
particularly the "legal origins" theorem and the "legal transplants" de-
bate. For example, while we find some evidence of legal transplants,
we show that the notion of legal origins has only limited value in to-
day's corporate law. Furthermore, the research has a public policy
dimension since the existence or absence of differences matters for the
question of whether formal harmonization of corporate law in the EU,
or further afield, is necessary, desirable, or at all possible.
* David L. Cabrelli, Senior Lecturer in Commercial Law, University of Edin-
burgh, United Kingdom. Mathias M. Siems, Professor of Commercial Law, University
of Durham, United Kingdom. This article is based on Chapters 1 and 12 of COMPARA-
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INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis of 2008 led to a stagnation, or even a
decrease, in international investments and cross-listings.' However,
this situation seems to be in the process of changing once again. Since
the 2013 report accompanying the KOF Index of Globalization ob-
serves a slight recovery in the onward march of economic
globalization, 2 it can be expected that the internationalization of
companies will also continue. It therefore remains crucial to under-
stand how and why corporate laws differ across countries and how
improvements, based on national or international models, may be
made. The drive to enhance corporate laws and corporate governance
standards is also reflected in the 2014 consultation by the Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which has
launched a review of its 2004 Principles of Corporate Governance in
order to consider "recent developments in the corporate sector and
capital markets."3
The primary objective of this Article is to add to the existing aca-
demic literature in the field of comparative corporate law,4 albeit by
adopting a novel methodological approach to the subject. Up until
twenty years ago, the academic literature on comparative corporate
law tended to focus on the institutional structure of the corporation.
For instance, discussions centered around whether companies had
only one board of directors ("one-tier systems") or whether there was
a distinction between the management and supervisory board ("two-
tier systems"),5 whether companies should establish committees (re-
1. Data are published by, e.g., the OECD, the World Bank, and the World Feder-
ation of Exchanges. See Guide to OECD International Direct Investment Statistics,
UK DATA SERVICE, http://ukdataservice.ac.uk/use-data/guides/datasetinternational-
investment.aspx; Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; Sta-
tistics, WORLD FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES, http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics.
2. Press release, Mar. 1, 2013, available at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/.
3. See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD, http://oecd.org/corpo-
rate/oecdprinciplesofcorporategovernance.htm. For a discussion of the OECD
Principles see Mathias Siems & Oscar Alvarez-Macotela, The OECD Principles of
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A Successful Example of Networked Gov-
ernance?, in NETWORKED GOVERNANCE, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS AND THE LAW 257
(Mark Fenwick, Steven Van Uytsel & Stefan Wrbka eds., 2014).
4. The main general books on comparative corporate law are: MADS ANDENAS &
FRANK WOOLDRIDGE, EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW (2009); RADO BOHINC,
COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: AN OVERVIEW ON US AND SOME EU COUNTRIES' COM-
PANY LEGISLATION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2011); ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C.
DONALD, COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW (2010); ALAN DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, THE
GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2009); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CON-
TEXT (Klaus J. Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda & Harald Baum eds., 2005);
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW (2d ed..2009); CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES-CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY (Joseph A. McCahery,
Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers & Luc Renneboog eds., 2002); COMPARATIVE CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE: A FUNCTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (Andreas M.
Fleckner & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 2013).
5. See, e.g., CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
IN EUROPE (Paul Davies, Klaus Hopt, Richard Nowak & Gerard van Solinge eds.,
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muneration, appointment, audit committees etc.), the identity of
persons who could be appointed as a company's auditor (indepen-
dence, qualification, etc.), and the division of powers between the
board of directors and the shareholders in general meeting. While
this approach is important, it overlooked the dimension of specific
cases in corporate law matters and how the issues arising from dis-
putes were resolved in different jurisdictions. In recent years, the
research agenda has moved on to analyze specific thematic topics in
more detail from a comparative perspective, such as takeovers, 6 de-
rivative suits, 7 and self-dealing.8 In this Article, we intend to follow
in the same vein as that more recent non-structural and thematic
academic literature to subject specific issues related to directors' lia-
bility, creditor protection, and shareholders' rights and duties to the
scrutiny of a comparative assessment. One of the fundamental points
to be made is that comparative similarities, differences, and trends in
these topics may be best understood by analyzing how carefully de-
signed hypothetical cases would be solved in different countries.
In the project underlying this Article, the laws of ten distinct ju-
risdictions-namely Spain, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom,
Poland, Finland, Latvia, France, the United States (Delaware was
used as a proxy), and Japan-were addressed by national reporters
we appointed for this purpose. Each national reporter solved ten hy-
pothetical cases according to their national law.9 Our project,
methodology, findings, and conclusions were set out in a book pub-
lished in 2013. The process adopted is akin to the influential case-
based comparative methodology used by the so-called Common Core
project. 10 However, the Common Core only examines private law in a
2013); Paul Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Boards in Europe-Accountability and Conver-
gence, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 301 (2013).
6. John Armour & David Skeel, Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and
Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727
(2007).
7. THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
(Dan W. Puchniak, Harald Baum & Michael Ewing-Chow eds., 2012); ARAD REISBERG,
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORY AND OPERATION (2007); X.
Li, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTIONS (2007); Robert B.
Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Law-
suits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1764 (2004); Pearlie K.M. Choo, The Statutory Derivative
Action in Singapore-A Critical and Comparative Examination, 13 BOND L. REV. 81
(2001); Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the
United States, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1439 (1994); Deborah A. Demott, Shareholder Litiga-
tion in Australia and the United States: Common Problems, Uncommon Solutions, 11
SYDNEY L. REV. 259 (1988).
8. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430 (2008).
9. COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH (Mathias Siems &
David Cabrelli eds., 2013). See also the reviews by Richard C. Nolan, 130 LAw Q. REV.
343 (2014); Demetrio Maltese, 72 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 768 (2013); Peter Watts, NEW ZEA-
LAND L.J. 318 (2013). See also infra Part IL.
10. COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH, supra note 9, 16-18
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narrow sense (contract, tort, etc.). Therefore, our project aimed to fill
a gap in the comparative law literature by adopting a similar ap-
proach in the field of corporate law.1 '
The present Article uses this comparative information in order to
enquire whether conceptual differences exist between countries in
terms of the source, form, style, or substance of the legal rules which
comprise their corporate laws. The findings of this assessment can be
used to evaluate arguments developed in the academic literature
which posit that the existence of fundamental differences in the pro-
tection of shareholders across countries reduces the scope for
convergence in corporate law systems. 12 The results can also reveal
the constituencies (directors, minority shareholders, majority share-
holders, creditors, etc.) preferred in the cases in the differing
jurisdictions, which can be plotted and evaluated. The case-based
evaluation is also applied to make a contribution towards other influ-
ential theories in comparative law, particularly the "legal origins"
theorem and the "legal transplants" debate. Furthermore, the re-
search has a public policy dimension since the existence or absence of
differences matters for the question of whether formal harmonization
of corporate law in the European Union (EU) or further afield is nec-
essary, desirable, or at all possible.13
To set the scene, Part I outlines central debates in the compara-
tive corporate law literature and how the ten cases drawn have the
potential to provide useful insights into the relevance and soundness
of the arguments advanced in terms of those debates. Part II explains
the case-based approach in more detail. In particular, the focus is on
the form, style, and substance of the ten cases, within the rubric of
the following themes: (1) directors' liability; (2) creditor protection;
and (3) shareholders' rights and protection and the flexibility of cor-
porate law. This Part also considers the method and practicalities of
adopting a comparative case-based approach, as well as the coding of
twenty components from the ten cases. In Part III, the focus shifts to
the main findings of the case-based research, including some of the
implications of the results for salient debates in the area of compara-
tive corporate law. Finally, the Article ends with a brief summary
and conclusion.
11. See supra note 4 for existing works on comparative corporate law.
12. For references on the convergence debate, see infra notes 14-17.
13. For the EU debate see, e.g., Modernisation of Company Law and Enhance-
ment of Corporate Governance, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/internal-
market/company/modern/index.en.htm.
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I. CENTRAL DEBATES IN COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW
A. Introduction
One of the principal objectives of the case-based research we con-
ducted was to identify and understand possible differences and
similarities between legal systems in corporate law. By identifying
the affinities between corporate law regimes as well as the extent,
nature, and scope of the disparities, the project has the potential to
offer insights into the validity of three of the most central ongoing
debates in the field of comparative corporate law: the "convergence
versus divergence," the "legal origins," and the "legal transplants"
debates. All of these debates are cross-cutting and overlap to some
degree, which may be attributed to the fact that each of them at some
level addresses the extent to which a single, carefully prescribed
framework can ever function as the optimal "default operating sys-
tem" of corporate law.
In the remainder of Part I, we discuss these three debates. In
addition, the final paragraphs of the next three subsections consider
how the case-based approach of this Article (and its underlying pro-
ject) has the potential to add important insights to these debates.
B. Convergence, Divergence, and Corporate Governance Systems
First, the findings of the research have the capacity to make a
contribution towards the "convergence versus divergence" debate in
corporate law. The key work in this vein is the article by Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman which argued that the share-
holder-oriented model of modern U.S. corporate law would ultimately
"win out" in a competition with the more traditional managerial
model of U.S. corporate law and the stakeholder- and state-oriented
models of civil law countries. 14 Indeed, there is evidence that the le-
gal systems of continental Europe and Asia have copied investor-
related provisions from U.S. law, without there being a converse feed-
back into U.S. law. Thus, lawmakers in other countries are keen to
improve the potential of their companies to attract capital, due to in-
tensified international competition. U.S. law is particularly
influential here as large foreign companies are often listed on U.S.
markets, U.S. institutional investors have special weight, and the
United States can exert political pressure as a world power.15 Fur-
ther, particular studies have supplied evidence of convergence, 16 with
14. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001). See also infra Parts III.D and IV.
15. MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAw 226-27 (2008).
16. The scholarship has pointed to a myriad of diverse possible modes of conver-
gence, such as "formal," "functional," "contractual," "hybrid," "normative," and
"institutional" convergence. See the various contributions in Ronald J. Gilson, Global-
izing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
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a number of factors such as securities law and stock market require-
ments coalescing to dilute the differences between corporate law
regimes across the world. 17 This convergence is partly attributable to
the growth of globalization and, in particular, the pressures exerted
by competition, interest groups, and imitation.
It is no exaggeration to say that Hansmann and Kraakman's ar-
ticle generated a formidable reaction amongst comparative corporate
law scholars across the world. But many contested their arguments.
Some scholars objected that path dependencies still play an impor-
tant role. As regards the law, this may be the result of fundamentally
different legal mentalities between common and civil law countries,' 8
and in terms of corporate governance, historical and cultural differ-
ences may persist, reflecting different types of market economies.' 9
Proponents of "path-dependence" theory argue that the structure of a
jurisdiction's corporate governance system and the shape of its corpo-
rate laws are conditioned by its cultural, social, economic, and
political past.20 Hence, "history matters," since once a jurisdiction
has embarked upon a particular path, legal systems become "locked
in" and conditioned by institutions built up within the system over
the years. As a result, strong complementarities between different in-
stitutions in the system are generated, rendering it difficult and
inefficient for that jurisdiction to suddenly shift direction by intro-
ducing an altogether novel set of institutions. For this reason, "path-
dependence" proponents argue that the uniqueness of corporate gov-
ernance systems ought to be strengthened and permitted to evolve
organically in accordance with the existing legal, political, social, and
329, 337-50 (2001); Paul Rose, EU Company Law Convergence Possibilities After Cen-
tros, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 134-35 (2001); Curtis J. Milhaupt,
Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate
Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2125-28 (2001); David Charny, The German
Corporate Governance System, COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 145, 165 (1998). For different
forms of convergence see also SIEMs, supra note 15, 23-24.
17. For the debate, see, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects
for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 641, 679-80 (1999); Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of
"Global" Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321 (2001);
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2-6 (Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Mark J. Roe eds., 2004).
18. Cf, not specifically on corporate law, PIERRE LEGRAND, LE DROIT COMPARE
(2006); Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 52 (1996).
19. See, e.g., THOMAS CLARKE, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CoM-
PARATIVE APPROACH 266 (2008); Branson, supra note 17, at 321.
20. See BRIAN CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS
TRANSFORMED 55-56 (2008); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Econom-
ics, 109 HARv. L. REV. 641, 653-60 (1996); Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance
and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 327,
329-34 (1996); Coffee, supra note 17, at 646-47, 660-61.
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economic infrastructure. 21 More nuanced positions are also possible.
For instance, it could be said that, today, legal systems do not differ
primarily because of different legal families, but rather on account of
their belonging to a particular regional group. In particular, this may
be the case in Europe, where the EU has harmonized some aspects of
corporate law and the Europeanization of economic and legal think-
ing may also have led to convergence on other topics.
Other commentators have been critical on different grounds.
Some have been of the view that the effect of regulatory competition
amongst jurisdictions runs counter to convergence, leading inexora-
bly to greater divergence amongst legal systems as each jurisdiction
competes and engages in a "race to the bottom" to attract incorpora-
tions.22 Further reasons advanced to explain why we ought to be
skeptical about the potential for such convergence include cultural
constraints, political-economic barriers, and the variations across ju-
risdictions in the legal rules addressing the protection of
shareholders.
In particular, the arguments against convergence theory are
closely connected with the divergence in the structure of share owner-
ship of companies one finds in common law and civil law countries. In
the capitalist market economies of common law jurisdictions such as
the United Kingdom and the United States-which are categorized
as "liberal market economies" in the "varieties of capitalism" litera-
ture in the field of comparative political economy23-the corporate
governance system is referred to as an "outsider/arm's length" system
of ownership and control. Ownership of the shares of large public cor-
porations quoted on the capital markets in such systems is widely
dispersed, with an absence of dominant controlling shareholders. 24
Some scholars have argued that the main focus of corporate laws in
such jurisdictions is on protecting shareholders as a class from con-
duct of managers and directors that is prejudicial to shareholder
interests, given that the latter are in a position to further their own
21. Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Own-
ership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); Udo C. Braendle & Juergen Noll,
On the Convergence of National Corporate Governance Systems, 17 J. INTERDISC.
ECON. 57 (2006); Mark Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Ja-
pan and United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1928 (1993); Gilson, supra note 20.
22. Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive
Corporate Law Market, 36 McGILL L.J. 138 (1991); Rose, supra note 16, at 121.
23. See, e.g.,VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COM-
PARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001); BEYOND VARIETIES OF
CAPITALISM: CONFLICT, CONTRADICTIONS, AND COMPLEMENTARITIES IN THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMY (Bob Hanck6, Martin Rhodes & Mark Thatcher eds., 2007).
24. See Simon Deakin, Richard Hobbs, Sue Konzelmann & Frank Wilkinson, An-
glo-American Corporate Governance and the Employment Relationship: A Case to
Answer?, 4 Socio-EcoN. REV. 155, 159-60 (2006); Klaus Hopt, Comparative Corporate
Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation, 59 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1, 9
(2011).
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interests at the expense of shareholders. As such, the "agency costs"
to be tackled here are of a "vertical" nature in dispersed share owner-
ship systems. 25 Furthermore, a large degree of emphasis is placed on
corporate disclosure and market control by outsiders. This can be
contrasted with "co-ordinated market economies" in the "varieties of
capitalism" literature, where the corporate governance system is "in-
sider/control-oriented" in nature. This taxonomy roughly maps onto
the corporate law regimes of the civil law jurisdictions where the
share ownership of public corporations is concentrated in a single or a
few blockholder controlling shareholders. 26 Such systems are charac-
terized by weak minority shareholder protection, a phenomenon
which is largely attributable to the ability of controlling shareholders
to extract private benefits by virtue of their dominance and control.
Since the governance of companies in such "insider/control-oriented"
systems is closely co-ordinated between management and the
blockholding controlling shareholders, many commentators 27 con-
tend that corporate law protections in civil law jurisdictions are
designed to protect minority shareholders. The argument runs that
the "agency costs" which arise in civilian "insider/control-oriented" ju-
risdictions are horizontal, i.e. attributable to a misalignment of the
interests of majority shareholders and minority shareholders, rather
than a vertical misalignment between the interests of directors and
shareholders generally as a class, which is predominant in common
law jurisdictions. 28
The debate as to which of the "outsider/arm's length" or "insider/
control-oriented" systems of ownership and control is superior or
more efficient has not been resolved: the jury is still out. With its
emphasis on case-based problem-solving across common law and civil
law jurisdictions, the approach we pursue in the present article has
25. See KAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 29-32, 35-38; CHEFFINS, supra note 20,
at 4-7.
26. See, e.g., Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, Introduction, in THE CONTROL OF COR-
PORATE EUROPE (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001); Mara Faccio & Larry H.
P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON.
365 (2002); Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of
Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81 (2000); Ron-
ald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1641 (2006).
27. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 29-32, 35-38; Cheffins supra note 20,
at 4-7; Erik Berglbf, A Note on the Typology of Financial Systems, in COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS 151-64 (Klaus Hopt & Eddy
Wymeersch eds., 1997); John Armour, Simon Deakin & Sue Konzelmann, Share-
holder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 BR. J. IND. RELAT.
531, 533 (2003); Brian Cheffins, Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the
Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RE-
GIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 147 (Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo
Raaijmakers & Luc Renneboog eds., 2002).
28. A third kind of "agency cost" is that which arises between shareholders and
non-shareholder constituencies such as suppliers, creditors, employees, etc. See
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 35-38; Cheffins, supra note 20, at 4-7.
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the potential to test the descriptive relevance of the dichotomy struck
in the literature between "outsider/arm's length" and "insider/con-
trol-oriented" systems of corporate governance. If the results point
towards the existence of legal techniques in civilian jurisdictions to
constrain horizontal agency costs in preference to vertical agency
costs, this will furnish some support for the position adopted in the
literature. Likewise, if the case-based methodology reveals that com-
mon law jurisdictions pay less attention to legal mechanisms whose
purpose it is to restrict horizontal agency costs, it will serve to make a
contribution to the "convergence versus divergence" debate. The case-
based approach is particularly well suited to such an endeavor, since
the solutions to the cases across the selected common law and civil
law jurisdictions can be compared and contrasted with the constitu-
ency favored by each of the solutions duly identified and coded.29
C. Legal Origins and Related Taxonomies
A closely related debate revolves around the relevance of the "le-
gal origins" theorem. 30 This theorem is connected to the wider notion
of "legal families" in the general comparative law literature (as well
as path-dependency theory, considered above). Thus, the following
starts with a review of the legal family classifications.
The core idea of legal families is that the diversity of legal sys-
tems around the world is not random but that groups of countries
share common features in terms of legal history, legal thinking, and
positive rules. Particular relevance is attributed to the distinction be-
tween common and civil law countries: common law and civil law are
said to "constitute the basic building blocks of the legal order, '31 and
this distinction is also seen as the "most fundamental and most dis-
cussed issue in comparative law."32
In particular, common law and civil law are said to differ in their
relevant sources of law and legal methods. In the civil law, the main
29. See further infra Part IV.D.
30. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Rob-
ert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POLIT. EcON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the
World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei
Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN.
EcoN. 3 (2000); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q. J. EcON.
1193 (2002); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches & An-
drei Shleifer, Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POLIT. ECON. 445 (2004); Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities
Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008)
[hereinafter La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, Economic Consequences]; Djankov
et al., supra note 8.
31. Vernon V. Palmer, Mixed Jurisdictions, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF COMPAR-
ATIVE LAW 591 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012).
32. UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICs 70 (1997).
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source of law is statute law, underpinned by academic writings. The
main pieces of legislation are "codes," which provide a logical, system-
atic, and coherent set of rules to be applied by judges in a deductive
and legalistic way. The common law, by contrast, is at its core case
law: the judiciary reason inductively from case to case, paying close
attention to the facts and remaining constantly aware that such rea-
soning is not strictly logical but is also based on common sense. 3
Thus, in the common law, not only do the judiciary aim to solve indi-
vidual disputes, but their decisions are a means of developing the law
"from below," with previous judgments acting as precedents, some of
which will be binding in future cases; hence, the common law is some-
times said to have an advantage in terms of adaptability.34 Common
law judges are also said to be more prepared to display judicial crea-
tivity and are praised for being "market-wise," for instance, in
guaranteeing "freedom of contract."35
Meanwhile, judges in civil law countries are said to reason very
differently. They have discretion in interpreting statutory law, but
once this is completed, they are mere "law-appliers" expected to fol-
low a strict legal syllogism: first, they identify the legal rule and how
it should be interpreted; second, they subsume the facts within these
legal rules; and, third, they apply the consequences of the legal
rules. 36 Since court decisions are only binding between the parties to
the dispute ("inter partes"), case law is typically not regarded as a
source of law. Moreover, this difference between judges in common
and civil law countries can be related to differences in appointment
and status: while in the former countries, it is typically experienced
lawyers who are appointed or elected as judges, the latter countries
usually have a career judiciary with an arguably less distinguished
social status.37
It is also often said that the role of legal scholarship reinforces
the extent of the civil law and common law divide. The civil law tradi-
tion is associated with the concept of "learned law," which is a
stronger trend in Germany than in France, but not entirely irrele-
vant in the latter jurisdiction. In particular, law professors have had
a strong influence on the character of German law, in contrast to the
33. For an overview, see JAN M. SMITS, THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW:
TOWARDS A lus COMMUNE EUROPAEUM AS A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM 73-94 (2002). For
details, see the contributions in 77 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND IN-
TERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 300-87 (2013) (based on a symposium entitled The
Dialogue Between Legal Scholarship and the Courts).
34. Thorsten Beck, Ash Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, Law and Finance: Why
Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 653 (2003).
35. Benito Arruftada & Veneta Andonova, Common Law and Civil Law as Pro-
Market Adaptations, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 81 (2008).
36. JAMES R. MAXEINER, GYooi-o LEE, ARMIN WEBER & HARRIET WEBER, PRACTI-
CAL GLOBAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: UNITED STATES-GERMANY-KOREA 33, 241 (2010).
37. For details (as well as criticism of this apparent divide), see MATHIAS SIEMS,
COMPARATIVE LAW 41-71 (2014).
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importance of the judiciary in England and the legislature in
France. 38 For example, legal scholars perform a key role in the statu-
tory interpretation of legislation, with this approach particularly
evident in Germany. They produce detailed multi-volume annotated
guides on the main codes, and monographs, textbooks, and journals
also deal extensively with the interpretation of statutory law. Often,
then, what emerges is a predominant view (herrschende Lehre in Ger-
many, la doctrine in France) which is treated as being as
authoritative as the positive law itself.3 9
By marrying the "legal families" approach with comparative cor-
porate law, a particular variant of the former-referred to as the
"legal origins" theorem in shorthand-has gained a considerable de-
gree of currency, occupying vital territory in the field of comparative
law. The principal contention advanced by the "legal origins" theorem
was propounded in a series of articles penned by Rafael La Porta and
colleagues. The study conducted by La Porta et al. used a quantita-
tive methodology in order to examine the differences in shareholder
protection in forty-nine countries and its impact on financial develop-
ment. For the purposes of measuring the law, eight variables were
used as proxies for shareholder protection: "one share one vote,"
"proxy by mail allowed," "shares not blocked before the meeting," "cu-
mulative voting," "oppressed minorities mechanism," "pre-emptive
rights to new issues," "share capital required to call an extraordinary
shareholder meeting," and "mandatory dividend." For each variable,
every country in the study was coded as "1" where shareholder pro-
tection was present, and as "0" where it was not.40 La Porta et al.
found that corporate law regimes grounded in the tradition of the
common law were more protective of shareholders than civilian
systems:
Compared to French civil law, common law is associated
with (a) better investor protection, which in turn is associ-
ated with improved financial development, better access to
finance, and higher ownership dispersion, (b) lighter govern-
ment ownership and regulation, which are in turn associated
with less corruption, better functioning labor markets, and
smaller unofficial economies, and (c) less formalized and
more independent judicial systems, which are in turn associ-
38. RAOUL C. VAN CAENEGEM, LEGISLATORS, JUDGES, PROFESSORS 67 (1987). See
also RAOUL C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE 44-45
(2002).
39. See UGO MATTEi, TEEMU RUsKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER'S COMPARA-
TIVE LAW 442 (7th ed. 2009).
40. Other studies have applied this approach to measuring law to many other
areas of law, and have mostly confirmed the supremacy of common law countries: see
summary in Mathias Siems & Simon Deakin, Comparative Law and Finance: Past,
Present and Future Research, 166 J. INST. THEORETICAL ECON. 120 (2010).
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ated with more secure property rights and better contract
enforcement.41
The argument posits that the direct correlation between regimes
which protect shareholders and the sophistication of the state of the
capital markets and financial development of a jurisdiction means
that civil law countries suffer from a weaker level of stock market
development. This has developed into a highly influential body of aca-
demic literature, 42 particularly via the Doing Business reports of the
World Bank.43 The ascendancy of the common law position is said to
be attributable to a low level of government ownership and regula-
tion of corporations, less formalized judicial procedures, and the
emphasis it attaches to the reasoned and incremental development of
corporate law through a highly independent judiciary.44 Common law
regimes are cast as pursuing a market-based approach, where the
shareholder's individual interests are to the fore. Moreover, in these
countries, capital markets are seen as more developed, so that inter-
est in shares is broader and shareholder ownership is often
dispersed. 45 In civil law countries, by contrast, concentrated owner-
ship structures mostly prevail in publicly traded companies. 46 Since
management cooperates with the dominant shareholders, relations
within the company are more important than control through the
markets. This "insider model" is to be explained by the fact that
banks and employees hold a strong position. The firm is accordingly
run not primarily in the interests of shareholders, but in the interests
of all stakeholders in the undertaking. In these countries too, state
influence has a large part to play, so that political views are brought
to bear inside the companies.
Further distinctions are frequently made. For instance, since the
category of non-Anglo-Saxon countries is very broad, it is suggested
that one must distinguish between German, Latin (in the sense of the
Romance language countries, i.e. Italy, France, Spain, etc.), and Jap-
anese (or Asian) models of corporate governance. In this vein, for
example, it may be said that only the German model tends to present
a mandatory division between the management and supervisory
board, that the Latin and Japanese models are more network-ori-
ented than the German model, and that stock markets are more
important in the German and Japanese models than in the Latin
41. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, Economic Consequences, supra note 30,
at 298.
42. See Boris Durisin & Fulvio Puzone, Maturation of Corporate Governance Re-
search, 1993-2007: An Assessment, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE 266 (2009).
43. See WORLD BANK: DOING BusINEss, www.doingbusiness.org.
44. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, Economic Consequences, supra note 30,
at 286.
45. Hopt, supra note 24, at 9.
46. See supra note 26.
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model.47 Another distinction is between the corporate law and corpo-
rate governance systems of developed, developing, and transition
economies. In particular, the transition economies of Eastern Europe
and Asia have received close attention since in the 1990s, they were
viewed as an interesting test case on the switch from socialism to a
system of privately owned companies. 48
The "legal origins" theorem has generated a great deal of contro-
versy. The critiques vary from concerns about the failure of the
theory to consider the political determinants of corporate law and cor-
porate governance systems to the adequacy of the methodological
approach adopted by La Porta et al. and the assumptions that under-
pin the conclusions drawn from the empirical results.49 For example,
on the political front, Mark Roe refers to the tendency of governments
of a "left-wing" social democratic hue to favor the interests of labor
over capital; in such systems, the government eschews corporate laws
protecting shareholders as a class in order to prioritize the demands
of labor, which leads to greater conflicts between the interests of
shareholders and directors/managers. The resulting greater opportu-
nities for vertical agency costs are attributable to the policy
preferences of those "left-wing" governments with a social democratic
tradition.50
Turning to the methodological deficiencies, the finding that ro-
bust shareholder rights lead to more effective and efficient capital
markets and financial development was reached by La Porta et al. on
the basis of a limited range of coded variables 51 and "cross-sectional
47. James Keenan & Maria Aggestam, Corporate Governance and Intellectual
Capital: Some Conceptualisations, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 259 (2001). But see also the
literature cited supra note 5 (on further similarities and variations between board
models).
48. See, e.g., Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian
Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1731
(2000).
49. Some of the critical literature is as follows: Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law's Lim-
its, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (2002); Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics and Modern
Stock Markets, 120 HARv. L. REV. 460 (2006); Mathias Siems, Shareholder Protection
Around the World: "Leximetric II", 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111 (2008); John Armour, Si-
mon Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar, Mathias Siems & Ajit Singh, Shareholder Protection
and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 343 (2009); John Armour, Simon Deakin, Priya Lele & Ma-
thias Siems, How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-country Comparison
of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 579 (2009); Ruth
V. Aguilera & Cynthia A. Williams, "Law and Finance": Inaccurate, Incomplete, and
Important, BYU. L. REV. 1413 (2009); John Armour, Simon Deakin, Viviana Mollica &
Mathias Siems, Law and Financial Development: What We are Learning from Time-
Series Evidence, BYU L. REV. 1435 (2009); Kathryn Pistor, Re-thinking the "Law and
Finance" Paradigm, BYU L. REV. 1647 (2009); John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Fi-
nance and Politics: The Case of India, 43 LAw & Soc'y REV. 491 (2009).
50. MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 21-26
(2003).
51. Priya Lele & Mathias Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach,
7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17 (2007).
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data on the [company] laws of countries in the late 1990s, with no
systematic coding of legal change over time."52 Studies conducted on
the basis of longitudinal time-series coding systems have demon-
strated that the evidence for a correlation between legal origins and
stock market development is much more tenuous. 53 Moreover, these
studies revealed that the level of shareholder protection in civil law
regimes has been catching up with common law jurisdictions in re-
cent years. 54 Subsequent research has also identified many coding
errors,5 5 and when the index is recalibrated to remove them, the cor-
relations found by La Porta et al. simply disappear.5 6 A number of
additional problems have been found, relating to both the legal and
the econometric elements of these studies. 57 It is also not entirely
self-evident that similarities and differences between legal systems
can be explained by the distinction between countries with English,
French, and German legal origin. Since countries of the same legal
origin are often neighboring countries with a similar culture, La
Porta et al.'s results may simply show that geographic vicinity and a
common culture make it likely that the laws of two countries influ-
ence each other. In itself, such a conclusion appears entirely
unremarkable. Moreover, historical linkages between countries may
have become weaker as a consequence of the convergence of legal and
economic systems.
Turning to the criticism of the assumptions underpinning the
findings reached by La Porta et al., Katharina Pistor propounds three
fallacies which lie at the heart of the "legal origins" theorem. First,
there is the "extrapolation fallacy"-the unsubstantiated assertion
that common law systems with stronger legal protections for share-
holders invariably incentivize smaller investors to save their money
in shares, leading to a broader investor base and greater capital mar-
ket development.58 Second, Pistor advances the "transmission
problem," which criticizes the supposed unidirectional impact of legal
origin on specific legal provisions in regulations, statutes, and case
law, and on more efficient economic outcomes. 59 Here, La Porta et al.
52. Armour, Deakin, Mollica & Siems, supra note 49, at 1437-38.
53. Armour, Deakin, Sarkar, Siems & Singh, supra note 49.
54. Id.
55. Sophie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States
and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697 (2005); Udo
Braendle, Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany-"Law and Finance" Re-
visited, 7 GERMAN L.J. 257 (2006).
56. Holger Spamann, The "Antidirector Rights Index" Revisited, 23 REV. FIN.
STUD. 468 (2010).
57. See, e.g., CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: WHAT
CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT
AROUND THE WORLD 27-44 (2008); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive
Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1313-16 (2009).
58. Pistor, supra note 49, at 1648-56.
59. Id. at 1656-59.
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fail to address the possible feedback between legal origins, specific
legal provisions, and stock market development, i.e. reverse causal-
ity. Finally, there is the "exogeneity paradox" whereby La Porta et al.
assume that a country's legal origin is exogenous and thus indepen-
dent of the political, social, economic, and cultural context. Instead,
there is evidence which shows that the state of a jurisdiction's stock
market and economic development is dependent on a number of fac-
tors, including political and economic events and shocks.60
Aware of these criticisms, La Porta et al. subsequently refined
their methodological approach, producing an index that encompassed
a broader range of themes than the original anti-director rights in-
dex. Two papers were published, 61 the first of which examined the
ease of private and public enforcement of rules designed to constrain
self-dealing, with the private means of enforcement duly divided into
ex ante and ex post constraints.6 2 The findings pointed to correlations
of statistical importance in relation to the state of development of a
jurisdiction's stock market, on the one hand, and the robustness of its
public and private enforcement of self-dealing rules on the other.
Meanwhile, there were also statistically significant correlations be-
tween the extent of concentration of share ownership in a
jurisdiction's public corporations and the degree of ex post private
regulation of self-dealing. The second paper 63 sought to address some
of the more fundamental critiques of their original empirical investi-
gation. Having recalibrated their empirical tools, the authors
nonetheless reaffirmed "the [basic] idea that legal origins-broadly
interpreted as highly persistent systems of social control of economic
life-have significant consequences for the legal and regulatory
framework of the society, as well as for economic outcomes."64
We submit that the case-based approach adopted here has the
ability to offer some input into the legal origins paradigm. It com-
pares jurisdictions according to whether they are protective of
directors, majority shareholders, minority shareholders, or creditors,
as determined through carefully constructed hypothetical cases. Al-
though one cannot go so far as to contend that the findings of such a
case-based methodology will operate to reveal the rationales for di-
vergences in shareholder protection across the selected jurisdictions,
there is considerable force in the view that it will serve to capture
nuances in the level of shareholder protection which the cruder "bi-
nary type" methodological approach of La Porta et al. is unable to
achieve. Moreover, it has the added attraction of possessing the ca-
60. Id. at 1659-62.
61. Djankov et al., supra note 8; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, Economic
Consequences, supra note 30.
62. Djankov et al., supra note 8.
63. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, Economic Consequences, supra note 30.
64. Id. at 326.
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pacity to expose the differences in the source/form and style of the
legal rules that function to confer protection on the various constitu-
encies of directors, shareholders, and directors.6 5
D. Legal Transplants in Corporate Law
Finally, we move on to consider the relevance of the case-based
methodology deployed in this Article to the "legal transplants" debate
in the comparative corporate law literature. This debate is also
closely linked to the "convergence versus divergence" and "legal ori-
gins" debates. The "legal transplants" theory asserts that it is
"socially easy"66 to lift a rule or system of law from one jurisdiction to
another. The theory was developed by Alan Watson in his studies on
Roman law. The underlying point made by Watson, which is signifi-
cant for the case-based project adopted here, is that law is an
autonomous phenomenon and can be divorced from the social, cul-
tural, economic, and political background within which it operates.
Instead, the legal tradition, rather than those contextual factors, is
more important in determining whether the adoption of a particular
rule or body of law by one particular legal system from another (a)
ought to be pursued in normative terms and (b) will be successful.6 7
For that reason, Watson rejects the contention that contextual fea-
tures ought to be given wider consideration prior to any legal
borrowing for fear that the recipient legal system will reject the
transplant.
This point is developed further by Roger Cotterrell, who draws a
distinction between instrumental law and culturally based law. Un-
like family law, which is conditioned by a jurisdiction's social and
cultural context, and constitutional and administrative law, which
are shaped by its political culture, Cotterrell argues that company
and commercial law are relatively culturally neutral in nature, since
such laws are inextricably linked to "economic interests rather than
national customs or sentiments."68 For that reason, corporate laws
are more easily transplantable than family or succession laws, and
there is less scope for them to be rejected when borrowed by a host
jurisdiction with a wholly distinct contextual background from that of
the home jurisdiction.
However, not all scholars are convinced by Watson's theory. The
skeptics can be grouped into two camps, namely the contextualists
and the culturalists. First, the contextualists reject the idea that law
65. See infra Part III.C.
66. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANT: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAw 95 (2d
ed. 1993).
67. Id. at 108. See also Alan Watson, Society's Choice and Legal Change, 9 HOF-
sTRA L. REV. 1473 (1980-1981).
68. Roger Cotterrell, Is There a Logic of Legal Transplants?, in ADAPTING LEGAL
CULTURES 71, 82 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001)
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is an exogenous phenomenon and will be accepted by a host jurisdic-
tion irrespective of its culture and context. For example, Otto Kahn-
Freund takes the position that "any attempt to use a pattern of law
outside the environment of its original country entails a risk of rejec-
tion... [and] its use requires a knowledge not only of the foreign law
but also of its social and above all political contexts."69 The difference
between the contextualists and the culturalists is a matter of degree,
since the latter take the more extreme position that the notion of le-
gal transplants should be rejected outright. The leading proponent of
the culturalist argument is Pierre Legrand, who asserts that "[i] n any
meaningful sense of the term, 'legal transplants' . . . cannot hap-
pen."70 Here the argument is that once received, a rule or system of
law is no longer comparable to its original incarnation in the home
jurisdiction. Instead, the form and style of the rule or system of law is
refined and shaped by the local context, environment, and culture to
the extent that it no longer makes sense to talk of the subject of study
as a "legal transplant."
The methodology adopted in the study that forms the basis of
this Article seeks to test some of these theories, particularly in light
of the Japanese experience and the 2004 accession of Poland and
Latvia to the EU. It is often said that the latter two jurisdictions,
particularly Latvia, share affinities with the German model of corpo-
rate law, and that the Japanese system imported a number of
corporate law rules from the United States following the Second
World War. Therefore, the case-based approach offers scope to make
a contribution to the legal transplants debate. It will do so by reflect-
ing on whether the case solutions offer any evidence of the extent to
which formal or functional transplants have succeeded.71
II. THE PROJECT, ITS CASES, AND ITS COMPONENTS
A. Introduction
The case-based research project included ten hypothetical cases,
each of which contained two components that can be characterized as
legal issues for resolution, thus generating a total of twenty compo-
nents. Ten jurisdictions were chosen for review. National reporters
were appointed for each of the ten jurisdictions, and each of them
provided an analysis as to how each case would be solved in their
respective jurisdiction. The solutions to each of the two components
per case were then coded jurisdiction by jurisdiction in terms of (1)
69. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L.
REV. 1, 27 (1974); Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Comments on Cotterrell and Legal
Transplants, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 68, at 95.
70. Pierre Legrand, What "Legal Transplants"?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES,
supra note 68, at 57. For further discussion, see STEMS, supra note 37, at 191-221.
71. See, e.g., infra Part III.E.
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the form, style, and substance of the legal rules applied, including the
similarities and differences between those legal rules, (2) the under-
lying legal sources, and (3) the actual results. The findings drawn in
respect of(1), (2), and (3) are presented in Part III, below. In this Part
we explain the method of the underlying project, the choice of coun-
tries and case studies, and the coding of the twenty components in
more detail.
B. The Case-Based Method and Practicalities
1. Approaches to Comparative Law: The Functional Method
It is a trite observation that a comparative analysis that starts
with a particular legal feature (rule, concept, or institution) soon en-
counters difficulties if one of the legal systems under observation
does not have that particular feature. Thus, many comparatists sug-
gest that one should not start with a specific legal topic but with a
functional question, such as a particular socio-economic problem. In
the words of Ernst Rabel, it means that "rather than comparing fixed
data and isolated paragraphs, we compare the solutions produced by
one state for a specific factual situation, and then we ask why they
were produced and what success they had."72 The most striking ex-
ample of such an approach is the Common Core project adopted by
European academics interested in contract, tort, and property law. 73
However, this approach has also had its critics, who have challenged
the assumptions of the functionalist method. For example, some com-
mentators regard the assumption that all societies face the same
social problems as unacceptable; 74 they argue that human needs are
not universal but are conditioned by their environments. Moreover, it
is not at all untypical that law operates to serve more than one ex-
plicit function alone. Meanwhile, others challenge the very idea that
law serves particular functions. Legal rules may arise pursuant to a
72. Ernst Rabel, Sculpting the Agenda of Comparative Law: Ernst Rabel and the
Fagade of Language (David J. Gerber trans.), reprinted in RETHINKING THE MASTERS
OF COMPARATIVE LAw 190, 199 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001). For an interdisciplinary
overview of functionalism, see Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAw 339 (Mathias Reimann & Rein-
hard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
73. See COMMON CORE, www.common-core.org; see also David J. Gerber, The
Common Core of European Private Law: The Project and its Books, 52 AM. J. COMP. L.
995, 1001 (2004); OPENING Up EUROPEAN LAW, THE COMMON CORE PROJECT 50-53
(Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2007); SIEMS, supra note 37, at 31-33.
74. David Nelken, Comparative Law and Comparative Legal Studies, in COMPAR-
ATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 3, 22-23 (Esin Orticui & David Nelken eds., 2007); Julie De
Coninck, The Functional Method of Comparative Law: Quo Vadis?, 74 RABELS ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 318, 327 (2010);
Jaakko Husa, Farewell to Functionalism or Methodological Tolerance?, 67 RABELS
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 419, 438 (2013);
H. Patrick Glenn, Com-paring, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra, at 91, 95;
Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 190 (2002).
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complex process of historical path-dependencies, cultural precondi-
tions, and legal transplants, and such rules also shape the problems
of society.
However, we submit that these objections do not discredit func-
tionalism as a whole. In fact, the aspiration is that this case-based
project will serve to underscore how the use of hypothetical cases can
offer important insights in the field of comparative corporate law. It
may also be seen as providing evidence that practical problems in
corporate law are not so diverse across the ten countries selected as
to make a case-based comparison worthless. 75
In the next subsection, we address the practicalities of the case-
based project discussed in this Article, in particular the choice of
countries and the procedure applied.
2. The Choice of Countries-and the Modus Operandi of the
Project
In accordance with one of the objectives of the project identified
above, i.e. whether formal harmonization of corporate law in the
EU-or further afield-is necessary, desirable, or at all possible, our
main focus in this study76 was on the Member States of the EU. How-
ever, owing to constraints of space, it was not possible to cover the
law of all twenty-eight Member States. Therefore, the focus was fixed
on the most populated countries (Germany, France, the United King-
dom, Spain, Italy, and Poland) as well as on two smaller and more
recently acceded Member States (Finland and Latvia). In addition,
we included the laws of two of the largest economies of the world, the
United States and Japan; their laws are significant and interesting
from a comparative perspective, since the United States is the most
important "exporter" of corporate governance theories and ideas, and
Japan's corporate law is comprised of a mixture of different legal tra-
ditions, having had a number of legal transplants over time. We
should clarify that the law of the U.S. state of Delaware was used as
a proxy for the United States as a whole. This is attributable to the
fact that Delaware corporate law is the most important and influen-
75. Nevertheless, we do not deny that the case-based approach adopted in this
work possesses certain inherent limitations. For example, it is unlikely that such an
approach will be useful in evaluating technical issues of corporate law such as the
content and design of the rules on the composition of board membership, the drafting
of prospectuses, or the transparency of securities markets. The same applies for topics
of transnational corporate law, such as the operations of cross-border and transna-
tional corporations, corporate group structures, and cross-border mergers and
acquisitions, since a case-based approach is typically focused on the laws of a selected
number of countries. For further caveats see infra Part III.A.
76. COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAw: A CASE-BASED APPROACH, supra note 9.
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tial in the United States, with a significant number of public and
private companies incorporated in that state.77
The coordination of the project entailed the appointment of one
or two national reporters for each of the ten jurisdictions under exam-
ination. We also selected the topics of each of the ten hypothetical
cases, with the issues to be addressed in each case loosely configured
around the issues of directors' duties, creditor protection, shareholder
duties/liabilities, and the flexibility of corporate law and its enforce-
ment.78 Each of the national reporters performed three tasks. First,
he or she drafted one hypothetical case and a solution to that case
according to the corporate law of his or her home jurisdiction. The
decision to enable each participant to draft one of the cases was pred-
icated on the perceived need to achieve a good mix and balance of
cases, possibly reflecting different socio-economic circumstances. Sec-
ondly, the national reporters then circulated their hypothetical cases
and solutions amongst the other national reporters, who produced so-
lutions to the other nine cases under the law of their home
jurisdictions. Thirdly, each national reporter examined the different
solutions to his or her hypothetical case and drew up a comparative
conclusion.
In examining the solutions to the ten cases provided by the na-
tional reporters, certain problems had to be overcome. For example,
the solutions received from the contributors often differed considera-
bly in terms of structure and style. However, a template on how the
solutions should be written and structured was deliberately not pro-
vided. Comparative lawyers often emphasize that it is differences in
legal style, not substantive rules, which are decisive for the common/
civil law divide.7 9 Thus, to some extent, this project had the secon-
dary aim of exposing these differences in legal thinking and writing.
However, this point should not be stretched too far. For example, if a
particular national solution contained many references to academic
literature, this may be an indicator of the civil law tradition,80 but it
could also be influenced by the individual style adopted by the na-
tional reporter in question.
C. The Ten Hypothetical Cases
The ten cases were selected in order to cover topics of directors'
duties and liabilities (cases one to four); creditor protection, including
77. Lucian A. Bebehuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Re-
considering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002);
Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 885 (1990).
78. See infra Part II.C.
79. See, e.g., KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAw 63-73 (3d ed. 1998).
80. See also infra Part III.B.
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the relationship between creditors and the company (cases five to
six); and the law relating to shares, shareholders, shareholder protec-
tion, and the flexibility of corporate law (cases seven to ten). The ten
hypothetical cases devised are available online for review.8 ' The
adoption of this approach has the potential to reveal the extent to
which the legal systems selected favor the interests of directors, ma-
jority shareholders, minority shareholders, or creditors. This feeds
into the higher-order abstract debates in the wider comparative cor-
porate law literature on the relevance of legal origins, "convergence
versus divergence," and legal transplants, discussed in Part I. Fur-
thermore, it has the scope to corroborate or refute the argument that
agency costs in common law jurisdictions are oriented towards the
minimization of vertical agency costs, and that legally constructed
constraints of horizontal agency costs represent the focus of civilian
systems of corporate law.
We also took the view that the cases ought to address different
types of companies. Thus, the aim was to have a good mix of scenarios
dealing with smaller, medium-sized, and more substantial compa-
nies. Four of the cases asked for a solution based on the applicable
law of private limited liability companies. Meanwhile, the remaining
six cases concerned public companies (i.e. joint-stock companies),
some of which had their shares admitted to a stock exchange/regu-
lated market.8 2 The cases are set out in greater detail in the following
three subsections.
1. Directors' Duties and Liability
The first four cases address the position of the ten jurisdictions
in respect of directors' duties and liabilities. The focus of the first case
was twofold. First, it sought to understand the source, nature, con-
tent, and scope of a director's duties of loyalty and care. Secondly,
Case 1 evaluated the ability of the shareholders in a general meeting
to ex ante authorize or ex post ratify a breach of a director's duty.
Meanwhile, Case 2 investigated the parameters of the legal obliga-
tions of nominee directors and the status of promissory notes that are
convertible into equity. The third case addressed the nature of the
duties of directors in a particular context where managerial loyalties
may be conflicted, namely that of a takeover bid. It also sought to
identify where the line is drawn between the powers of the directors
and the shareholders to take a particular form of defensive action in
81. See David Cabrelli & Mathias M. Siems, Convergence, Legal Origins, and
Transplants in Comparative Corporate Law: A Case-Based and Quantitative Analy-
sis-Online Supplement, available at http://ssrn.cora/abstract=2417610. They can
also be found in Mathias Siems & David Cabrelli, Form, Style and Substance in Com-
parative Company Law, in COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH,
supra note 9, at 363.
82. See also infra Part III.C.
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the case of a takeover bid. The fourth case likewise takes a takeover
situation as its focus. However, unlike the third case, the principal
concern of Case 4 was to identify the jurisdictions that apply pre-
emption rights on the allotment and issue of shares by a company. In
other words, the question was to what extent a company must first
offer a fresh issue of shares to the existing shareholders before it is
entitled to issue shares to non-shareholder third parties.
2. Creditor Protection
Two cases dealt with questions of creditor protection. The fifth
case, which relates to the law of creditor protection, assesses the abil-
ity of a creditor of a bankrupt company to seek recourse against the
shareholders or directors of that company. The first issue is whether
a doctrine such as "piercing the veil of incorporation" or some other
similar doctrine would permit the creditor to look behind the facade
of the separate legal personality of the company to enable it to en-
force against the bankrupt company's directors or shareholders.
Secondly, the national reporters were asked to consider the potential
for direct creditor recourse against the directors of the bankrupt com-
pany via the medium of directors' duties. In the sixth case, the focus
shifted to the operation of the capital maintenance principle found in
the domestic corporate law systems of many European jurisdictions
as well as in EU company law.8 3 It also addressed the degree to
which the corporate laws of the jurisdictions concerned prohibit or
constrain the capacity of companies to effect "disguised distributions"
of assets to the detriment of creditors, e.g. by transferring assets to a
third party or particular shareholder(s) at undervalue or by acquiring
assets from a third party or particular shareholder(s) in excess of
their market value.
3. Shareholders' Rights and Protections and the Flexibility of
Corporate Law
The remaining four cases concentrated on the general rights and
protections of shareholders and the flexibility of corporate law. Case
7 sought to establish whether shareholders have an entitlement to
challenge the decisions of majority shareholders where the latter
have failed consistently to vote in favor of the distribution of an an-
nual dividend over a period of time. The second matter addressed by
83. Directive 2012/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
October 2012 on Coordination of Safeguards which, for the Protection of the Interests
of Members and Others, Are Required by Member States of Companies Within the
Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, in Respect of the Formation of Public Limited Liability Companies
and the Maintenance and Alteration of Their Capital, With a View to Making Such
Safeguards Equivalent, 2012 O.J. (L 315) 74. (Previously, this was Directive 77/91/
EEC of 13 December 1976, 1976 O.J. (L 26) 1.)
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this case was whether the vote of an interested shareholder in favor
of merging the company with another company is somehow tainted
and can be ignored on the grounds that it is null and void. Mean-
while, the eighth case looked to understand the circumstances in
which shareholders have a right to ask questions of management at a
general meeting. It also analyzed the legal effect of a purported
breach of shareholder rights and whether this operates to invalidate
any resolutions passed at a general meeting. Case 9 highlighted the
legal processes recognized in the various jurisdictions that enable
shareholders to enforce their rights. One of the key issues addressed
was whether it is possible for an aggrieved minority shareholder to
challenge a breach of directors' duties or the actions of a controlling
shareholder through the medium of a derivative action, including the
qualifying conditions imposed on such litigation. Secondly, the flexi-
bility of the corporate law regimes of the ten jurisdictions was also
analyzed. National reporters were asked to consider whether it is
possible for a decision to be taken informally by the shareholders
with unanimous consent where corporate law rules or the terms of
the company's constitution specifically require a formal vote to be
taken at a properly convened general meeting of the shareholders.
Finally, the purpose of the tenth case was to consider whether any
legal constraints are placed on the ability of shareholders to restrict
the free transfer of shares in the company's constitution, e.g. through
the application of pre-emption rights on the transfer of shares in
favor of existing shareholders, and whether a company is able to re-
strict a third party from inheriting shares upon the death of a
shareholder.
D. The Coding of the Twenty Components
The ten case studies involved in the research deal with a variety
of legal topics. Thus, we abstracted two components for each case and
coded them for each country. Then, we addressed the resulting
twenty components at three levels, namely (1) the similarities and
differences in terms of the legal rules, (2) the underlying legal
sources, and (3) the actual results. The full codings are available on-
line.8 4 Table 1 illustrates how one of the two components of Case 6 on
creditor protection was coded.
84. See supra note 81.
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TABLE 1. CODING EXAMPLE FOR "VEIL PIERCING"
(CASE 6, FIRST COMPONENT) 8 5
FRA GER ITA SPA FIN POL LAT UK US JP
Legal rules A B B B B C C B B B
Explanation: concept of fictitious company (A); concept of
piercing the corporate veil (B); no such concepts (C)
Sources of law C IC IL,A IC ICA IN IN IC C C
Explanation: legislation (L); courts (C); academics (A) (if cited
as a quasi-source of law, instead of a further reference); (N)
problem unknown (i.e. no law).
Results C S S S I S S S S S S
Explanation: result favoring shareholders (S); creditors (C).
With respect to the category "legal rules," the coding was influenced
by two conflicting considerations. On the one hand, for the purposes
of the subsequent analysis, it would have been pointless to consider
each of the ten legal systems as unique. On the other hand, it would
have been equally uninteresting to say that at their core, all legal
systems tend to be similar. Thus, the twenty components were coded
with the aim of identifying between two and four groups of countries,
such as the three (A, B, C) in Table 1.
The coding of "sources of law" was understood in a functional
way. For instance, case law and academic writings have been in-
cluded notwithstanding that they are not regarded as a source of law
in a technical sense in all jurisdictions. In addition to the categories
shown in Table 1, in some of the twenty components the legal re-
sponses were based on self-regulation (such as corporate governance
codes) or left to the discretion of the company (e.g., its articles of
association).
The final category codes the results of the twenty components. In
the example of Table 1, there were only two options, namely that this
particular component of the case protects the interests of either the
shareholders or the creditors. In some of the other cases we also
coded the conflict between the interests of shareholders and direc-
tors, on the one hand, and minority and majority shareholders, on the
other.8 6 In some instances, we also had to code a country as not pro-
viding a clear answer to the component in question.
85. In this table, as well as the following ones, the countries are abbreviated as
FRA (France), GER (Germany), ITA (Italy), SPA (Spain), FIN (Finland), POL(Poland), LAT (Latvia), UK (United Kingdom), US (United States), and JP (Japan).
86. See also the discussion about agency costs supra Part I.B.
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III. MAIN COMPARATIVE FINDINGS
A. Introduction
Based on the coding explained in the previous Part, this Part en-
tails an evaluation of the nature and content of the respective legal
rules of corporate law, the sources of those rules, and the results
reached on the application of such rules. This approach enables quan-
tification of similarities and differences, going beyond anecdotal
examples. Since any quantitative information needs to be inter-
preted, paradigmatic cases are also referred to where necessary.
The following caveats need to be made. First, such data are sen-
sitive to the design of the cases. Yet, we hope that the assignment of
each national reporter to draft one of the cases achieved a good mix of
cases. As the organizers of the project, we coordinated the drafting of
the cases so as to strike a balance between cases addressing private
and public companies, as well as between cases dealing with the core
topics of directors' duties, creditor protection, and shareholders'
rights.8 7 It may also be noted that the subjective element in the selec-
tion of variables is by no means unique to the current study.88
Secondly, the solutions to each case were drafted by one or sometimes
two local lawyers; other lawyers from the same jurisdictions may not
have provided exactly the same answers. To mitigate against idiosyn-
crasy in this regard, as the project organizers, we read all solutions
and requested further explanations and references, in particular
where we found that a solution as submitted by a reporter did not
sound entirely plausible. We also asked the national reporters to clar-
ify whether their legal solutions were likely to be shared by other
lawyers from their countries, in circumstances where there was a de-
gree of doubt as to that solution.
B. Comparison of Legal Rules
The coding of the legal rules according to the twenty components
offered the opportunity to assess the similarities and differences be-
tween the ten countries. For this purpose the coded attributes (cf
Table 1) needed to be converted into relations showing the differences
between each pair of countries.8 9 This is achieved by ascertaining
whether each variable in the law of a particular country corresponds
to that of any of the other nine countries, whereby each observation of
87. See supra Parts II.B.2, C.
88. See supra Part I.C (for the discussion of the La Porta et al. studies).
89. On turning attributes into relations, see, e.g., ROBERT HANNEMAN & MARK
RIDDLE, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL NETWORK METHODS ch. 6 (2005), available at http://
faculty.ucr.edu/-hanneman/nettext/; DAVID KNoKE & SONG YANG, SOCIAL NETWORK
ANALYSIS 7 (2d ed. 2008). For its application to law, see also Mathias Siems, The Web
of Creditor and Shareholder Protection: A Comparative Legal Network Analysis, 27
ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 747 (2010).
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difference was coded as "1". Subsequently, the absolute values of
these differences are added together. For example, the coding in Ta-
ble 1 shows that France and Germany have different rules that
govern the topic of veil piercing (the first component of Case 6). Thus,
for this component, the difference between France and Germany is
"1." A corresponding procedure was applied to all twenty components.
Adding all of those numbers together led to the result that, for exam-
ple, in fifteen out of twenty components, France and Germany have
different legal rules.
TABLE 2. MATRIX OF DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL RULES
(MAX 20, MIN 0)
FRA GER ITA SPA FIN POL LAT UK US JP Mean
FRA 15 9 9 14 12 11 12 13 13 12
GER 15 9 10 11 8 10 13 16 13 11.67
ITA 9 9 8 11 8 10 12 10 12 9.89
SPA 9 10 8 10 8 6 11 10 12 9.33
FIN 14 11 11 10 10 12 11 14 17 12.22
POL 12 8 8 8 10 6 15 14 15 10.67
LAT 11 10 10 6 12 6 13 13 14 10.56
UK 12 13 12 11 11 15 13 11 11 12.11
US 13 16 10 10 14 14 13 11 10 12.33
JP 13 13 12 12 17 15 14 11 10 13
The outcome of this process is the matrix of differences in Table 2. It
reveals which countries are most similar to and different from the
other nine. The result is that Japan and the United States are the
most "eccentric" and Spain and Italy are the most "mainstream" (see
the final column). This may reflect the fact that Japan and the
United States are the only non-EU countries involved in the case-
based study. Though it has sometimes been said that EU
harmonization is trivial in corporate law, 90 a number of the case
solutions written by the national reporters referred to the EU
Directives, for instance, as far as takeovers are concerned, on
questions of capital maintenance and the right of shareholders to ask
questions in the general meeting. 91 The "mainstreamness" of Spain
and Italy also makes sense since the corporate laws of these countries
have been influenced by both the French and the German legal
traditions. However, overall, even the most similar countries have
90. Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial
Are They?, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1 (2006).
91. See COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH, supra note 9, chs.
4-6, 9.
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different legal rules in more than nine out of twenty components,
thus showing that the convergence of corporate laws has not led to
identical rules.
It is interesting to see whether certain intuitive expectations
about similarities are confirmed or refuted. The most similar pairs in
Table 2 are Latvia-Poland and Latvia-Spain, followed by
Spain-Italy, Spain-Poland, Germany-Poland, and Italy-Poland.
These results may show that European civil law countries are
relatively similar, as one would expect. With respect to the United
Kingdom and the United States, however, the difference between
them is considerable, and at least as high as some of the differences
which arise between them and civil law countries. For example, this
can be seen in the case studies on takeovers, as well as those on
shareholder rights and litigation.9 2 Similarly, the literature
frequently points towards differences between U.K. and U.S.
corporate law, in terms of both the legal rules and the law in action.9 3
There is also no evidence of an "Americanization" of continental
European countries, since the United States is not particularly close
to any of them. Finally, Table 2 shows that Japanese corporate law is
closer to that of the United States, as well as to that of the United
Kingdom, than it is to the law of any of the civil law countries, thus
confirming the Japanese shift towards the U.S. system, at least as far
as the positive rules are concerned. 94 For instance, the lack of general
pre-emption rights and the availability of derivative actions are
features of Japanese law that are shared with the United States, and
make it different from most continental European countries.95
The relative proximity of the jurisdictions to one another can be
presented as a network.96 For this purpose, the information about
each of the pairs was entered into a network analysis program
(UCINET) enabling us to represent only those "ties" (i.e.
relationships between countries) that are below a particular
92. See id. chs. 4-5, 9-10.
93. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-
LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013); MARc T.
MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE (2013); John Armour,
Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Richard Nolan, Private Enforcement of Corporate
Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States, 6 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 687 (2009); Ruth V. Aguilera, Cynthia A. Williams, John M.
Conley & Deborah E. Rupp, Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: A
Comparative Analysis of the UK and the US, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE 147 (2006);
Steven Toms & Mike Wright, Divergence and Convergence within Anglo-American
Corporate Governance Systems: Evidence from the US and UK, 1950-2000, 46 Bus.
HIST. 267 (2005).
94. For this shift since the mid-twentieth century, see, e.g., SIEMS, supra note 15,
at 20-22.
95. See COMPARATiVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH, supra note 9, chs.
5, 10.
96. The approach of this article is similar to Siems, supra note 89, but different
from Siems & Cabrelli, supra note 84 (where we displayed "neigbour networks").
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threshold. In Figure 1, the ties with a value of eleven or less (see
Table 2) are displayed, and the more similar the country pair the
bolder the tie in the figure. In addition, using the technique of
multidimensional scaling, the network analysis program has shifted
the position of nodes according to the strength of their relationships,
so that countries whose laws are relatively similar are moved closer
together.
FIGURE 1. NETWORK BASED ON SIMILARITY OF LEGAL RULES
(WITH TWO CLUSTERS)
As Figure 1 illustrates, the legal rules in Spain, Latvia, and Poland
are very close to one another, and are also relatively proximate to the
other continental countries (Germany, Finland, Italy, and France).
There are two links each between the United States and the United
Kingdom with continental European countries, but overall the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan are relatively distant
from all other countries. It can further be seen that the United States
and Japan are relatively close.
Network analysis also provides tools to identify community
structures.97 For the purpose of this Article, we calculated "optimiza-
tion clusters," a formal method that "[o]ptimizes a cost function
which measures the total distance or similarity within classes for a
97. See, e.g., KNoKE & YANG, supra note 89, at 77-91; HANNEmAN & RIDDLE, supra
note 89, chs. 11, 13.
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proximity matrix."9g The user has to determine how many clusters
will be created in advance. The coloring of the nodes in Figure 1 is
based on a division into two clusters which shows the aforementioned
divide between the seven continental European countries and the
three other countries.
We also calculated divisions into more clusters. It is then possi-
ble to compare the "fit" of these various divisions, finding that the
best fit is achieved if the data are divided into five clusters: 99 (1) the
United States and Japan, (2) Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, and
Latvia, and finally (3) Finland, (4) the United Kingdom, and (5)
France each set out on their own. This result produces the observa-
tion that the French civilian system of corporate law stands apart
from the German strand of the civil law, as well as the Spanish, Ital-
ian, and Eastern European jurisdictions. It also substantiates the
point articulated above that the U.K. common law regime is not as
closely aligned to that of the United States as is often assumed. An-
other notable point is that the identification of the five clusters
demonstrates the extent to which the German civil law tradition ex-
erts a degree of pull and influence over the legal systems of Italy and
Spain, which are more commonly aligned with the French civilian le-
gal family. This causes us to question whether the traditional
distinction between the German and French branches of the civil law
has any meaningful field of application in the area of corporate law.
C. Comparison of Underlying Sources of Law
Comparative lawyers often highlight differences in the prevalent
sources of law. It is frequently asserted that case law is more impor-
tant in common law jurisdictions, whereas in civil law countries,
codes and academic writings tend to play a stronger role. 00 In addi-
tion, the corporate law and corporate governance literature claims
that corporate law rules are frequently mandatory in continental Eu-
ropean legal systems, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon firms, which are
said to enjoy a greater degree of flexibility. 1 1 Thus, there may also be
differences in the extent to which questions are left to self-regulation
and the articles of association/corporate bylaws. But this is not with-
out controversy, as one of us has previously written:
All the same, in the countries studied here [France, Ger-
many, Japan, China, the United States, and the United
98. Definition taken from ANALYTIC TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.analytictech.com/
ucinet/help/2cvtid.htm. Note that this does not depend on the cutoff point used for the
purposes of Figure 1.
99. The precise numbers are fit -0.673 and r-square 0.453, as compared to fit
-0.614 and r-square 0.377 for a division into two clusters.
100. See supra Part I.C.
101. Id.
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Kingdom] convergence in shareholder law has come about.
This can be seen, first, in the relevant legal bases ....
[T]here are similar basic patterns, with codifications of com-
pany and securities law being supplemented by case law,
articles of association, shareholder agreements and corpo-
rate governance codes. Moreover, market forces play an
important part, without a legal system necessarily on that
account giving up statutory control mechanisms. 0 2
The evidence from the current case-based project is mixed. For exam-
ple, two of the case solutions show that civilian systems of corporate
law may be more inflexible than their common law counterparts inas-
much as the former are more likely to prohibit or restrict the ability
of companies to (i) include provisions in their articles which prevent
the heir of a deceased shareholder from inheriting the latter's shares
and (ii) issue debt securities convertible into equity. 10 3 However, this
can be contrasted with two other findings, which confirm that both
civilian and common law jurisdictions recognize (i) the highly flexible
informal unanimous consent rule or a functional equivalent in their
corporate laws and (ii) the validity of pre-emption provisions on share
transfers in the articles of their companies, with or without
restrictions.' 0 4
More comprehensively, the sources of law determining the re-
sults in respect of each of the twenty components have been
identified. 10 5 Table 3 presents the results.
TABLE 3. PREVALENCE OF SOURCES OF LAW
(MAX 20, THREE HIGHEST VALUES HIGHLIGHTED)
FRA GER ITA SPA FIN POL LAT UK US JP
Legislation 17 17 19 17 18 16 17 15 8 __18
Case law 11 13 5 3 2 2 1 15 15 10
Academic 1 11 7 9 3 6 2 0 0 2
Self-regulation 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 4 0 0
Discretion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
None 0 0 1 0 1 .3 3 1 0 12 1
It can be seen that legislation is the most relevant source for at least
75% (i.e. fifteen) of the components in all legal systems except the
United States. The difference between the United Kingdom and the
United States may be surprising, but it is not wholly implausible.
102. StEMS, supra note 15, at 225; see also id. at 59.
103. See COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH, supra note 9, chs.
3, 11.
104. See id., chs. 10-11.
105. See supra Part IID.
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The frequent reforms of U.K. corporate law have expanded the scope
and detail of the Companies Act. For example, in the U.K. Companies
Act 2006, topics such as directors' duties have now been partly
codified, whereas even in civil law countries such as France and
Germany, these are still largely based on case law. 10 6
The data also show that case law is not only important in the
United Kingdom and the United States but also in Germany, France,
and Japan. It plays less of a role, however, in the jurisdictions with a
smaller pool of case law, possibly because they have relatively new
corporate laws (Poland, Latvia) or because they are relatively small
jurisdictions (Finland, Latvia). It is also worth pointing out that to
say that case law plays a role in both civil and common law countries
does not mean that their actual mode of operation is identical in
practice; for instance, there may still be differences in terms of the
prevalent judicial approach, such as whether to adopt legal reasoning
based on ideas of justice or efficiency.
Academic research plays a significant role in many of the case
solutions from Germany, Italy, and Spain, whereas it was not
decisive for the United Kingdom and the United States. This could be
viewed as confirming the difference between the civil law-in
particular its German variant-and common law. 10 7 As with case
law, it may also make sense that academic writing is less important
in smaller jurisdictions (Finland, Latvia) than in larger ones.
The final three categories were revealed to be important in only a
limited number of countries. However, these remaining differences
can be explained. Self-regulation plays a relatively important role in
U.K. corporate law, for instance with respect to takeovers.10 8 In the
United States, there are a few instances where there is simply no law
at all or the decision is left to the discretion of the company; this is to
be explained by the "light approach" in regulating the internal affairs
of companies' 0 9 that has been adopted by Delaware, the corporate
seat of almost half of the listed companies in the United States.
Finally, Poland and Latvia have only relatively recently promulgated
a set of corporate laws. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that in a
few instances a response was received to the effect that a particular
legal problem or solution was not yet known.
106. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 171-78 (U.K.). For an overview, see Bernard
Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1: Substantive
Grounds for Liability, COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 614 (2007).
107. See supra Part I.C.
108. See, e.g., Armour & Skeel, supra note 6.
109. Critics call this a "race to the bottom." See William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). Conversely,
others emphasize its efficiency. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAW 14 (1993).
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Does the preference for a particular source of law vary between
private limited companies (such as the "Ltd." in the United Kingdom
and the "GmbH" in Germany) and public companies (i.e. joint-stock
companies such as the U.K.'s "plc" and the German "AG")? The
scenarios of the case studies underlying this Article always specified
the type of company in question.110 Yet, it must also be considered
that the form a company takes does not always correspond to the way
it operates in practice. For example, on the surface, the French SARL
resembles the German GmbH, and the French SA the German AG,
but in France, even small to medium-sized firms and family firms
often use the SA form. In addition, French law offers a third legal
form, the SAS, which was created to cover the area between the SA
and the SARL. 111 The implication of these factors for the project was
that while guidance was provided to national reporters on the type of
company that was expected to be covered in each of the individual
case studies, some contributors indicated possible alternative
solutions for different types of companies. On occasion, national
reporters also mentioned that a particular aim could not be pursued
by adopting the form of company prescribed in the scenario in
question, but that another form of company would have to be used or
would be available.
TABLE 4. PREVALENCE OF SOURCES OF LAW
Total Cases on Ltds Cases on plcs
Legislation 81.00% 85.00% 78.33%
Case law 38.50% 36.25% 40.00%
Academic 20.50% 26.25% 16.67%
Self-regulation 3.50% 0.00% 5.83%
Discretion 1.00% 1.25% 0.83%
None 5.50% 3.75% 6.67%
Notwithstanding this caveat, it is possible to calculate the prevalence
of the sources of law for Ltds and plcs. Table 4, above, shows that
there are only small differences. To be sure, this is also a reflection of
the scope of our project-its main focus was on topics of corporate
law. If one were to consider rules specifically applicable to companies
110. COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAw: A CASE-BASED APPROACH, supra note 9, chs. 2-3,
7, 10 deal with private companies, and chs. 4-7, 9, 11 with public companies.
111. A somewhat analogous situation exists in the United States. Here, a primary
distinction is made between closely and publicly held corporations, but businesses can
also establish a limited liability company (LLC). The success of state LLC laws is
particularly based on the fact that while LLCs have the legal form of a company, for
tax purposes they are treated as a partnership. In 2005, Japan also introduced the
LLC based on the U.S. model, but without the advantage of being taxed as
partnerships. By contrast, U.K. law provides for a Limited Liability Partnership(LLP) which, like U.S. LLCs, is structured similarly to a company but is taxed as a
partnership.
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admitted to a stock exchange, listing rules and other forms of
secondary regulation would play a decisive role for public companies.
As in the previous section, the data can be transformed into a
dataset showing the differences between countries. The matrix of
differences, analogous to Table 2, is available in the online
supplement. 112 Hence, it is once again possible to produce a network
picture, depicting the similarities and differences in terms of the
sources of law.
FIGURE 2: NETWORK BASED ON SIMILARITY OF SOURCES OF LAW
(WITH TWO CLUSTERS)
Germany
Finland
Ital France
pain
SLatvia U
PolandUK
Figure 2 can be explained as follows (also drawing on the information
from Table 3): Latvia, Finland, and Italy are fairly close since legisla-
tion is by far the most important source of law. Poland and Spain are
also similar to those countries, but here the academic literature also
plays a role. Thereafter, Germany, France, and Japan share some af-
finities with the aforementioned jurisdictions, but case law is more
influential in this regard. In France, the academic literature plays
less of a role than in the other civil law countries. The United King-
dom is similar to France, but with a prominent role performed by
self-regulation. Finally, the United States is very different from the
other countries since it relies much less on legislation in corporate
law than do the other nine countries.
112. See Cabrelli & Siems, supra note 81.
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Figure 2 also shows the coloring of the nodes according to two
clusters. Here, such a division of the dataset provides the best "fit."
1 13
It reflects a clear distinction between common and civil law countries,
since the United Kingdom and the United States belong to one clus-
ter, and the remaining eight countries to the other one. But, as the
discussion of this section has shown, this does not mean that there is
not also a great deal of variation within these clusters.
D. Comparison of Results
As explained above, 114 the ten cases of this study have been se-
lected in order to cover topics of directors' duties and liabilities,
creditor protection, including the relationship between creditors and
the company, and the law relating to shares, shareholders, share-
holder protection, and the flexibility of corporate law. Thus, it was
possible to examine whether legal systems tend to favor the interests
of directors, shareholders, or creditors. In addition, it should be
stressed that in companies with a dominant shareholder, the main
conflict is often between minority and majority/controlling sharehold-
ers. The findings from this case-based research harbored the
potential to answer the question whether: (1) civilian systems are in-
deed characterized by "insider/control-oriented" horizontal agency
problems that are addressed by policies in corporate law preferring
the interests of minority shareholders, and (2) common law regimes
prioritize the promulgation of rules in corporate law that seek to min-
imize vertical agency costs. All of this was reflected in the coding of
the results for the twenty components.1 15 Table 5 aggregates those
results and indicates the maximum that can be achieved in each of
the categories, given that not all potential interests are addressed in
each of those components."
16
113. The precise numbers are fit -0.641 and r-square 0.411.
114. See supra Part II.C.
115. See supra Part II.D.
116. For the precise codings of each of the twenty components, see Cabrelli &
Siems, supra note 81.
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TABLE 5: PREFERENCE FOR INTERESTS OF DIRECTORS,
SHAREHOLDERS AND CREDITORS
(HIGHEST VALUES HIGHLIGHTED)
1 1 7
FRA GER ITA SPA FIN POL LAT UK US JP
Directors
(max. 11).
Shareholders 4 434 31 13 4(max. 11)
Creditors 2' 1 2
(max. 3) 1 -
Majority
shareholders 3 2 1 2 2 3 3 4
(max. 8)
Minority
shareholders 4 2 4 4 4 1 0 1
(max. 8)
Unclear 1........ 2 0 3 3
(max. 20) 1 2 3 2
In the context of the position of directors, Table 5 points towards U.S.
exceptionalism since the US tends to favor directors more often than
the other countries. This is in line with other studies that stress the
predominance of the "director primacy" model in the U.S. corporate
law system,118 while disaffirming the view expressed by Hansmann
and Kraakman that modern U.S. corporate law leads the way in
having adopted a shareholder-oriented model. 119 Some scholars have
argued that the director primacy approach of U.S. corporate law has
worked very well,120 though others have suggested that existing
rights must be made more effective and that the power of
shareholders to modify the company's charter ought to be
improved. 121
117. In general, the highest two values are highlighted. However, the second
highest value is not highlighted if doing so would have meant that half or more of the
countries would be highlighted.
118. See Lele & Siems, supra note 51. Note that this specifically refers to U.S.
corporate law, while in securities and financial markets law, the United States may
be more effective in the protection of investors, for example through advanced
disclosure requirements and a well-funded securities regulator. For a similar point,
see Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities
Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2009).
119. See supra Part I.B.
120. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 233-55 (2012); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006).
121. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term
Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013); Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights
Seriously, 41 UC DAvis L. REV. 605 (2007); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders
Set the Rules, 119 HAnv. L. REV. 1784 (2006).
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A possible complication concerns the private enforcement of
rights, for instance through derivative actions. Here, it may be
argued that the U.S. position is favorable towards shareholders since
the combination of contingency fees and the "American cost rule"
creates good incentives to enforce breaches of directors' duties-in
contrast to the situation in other countries. 122 Some of our case
studies do also show that U.S. law is an effective system for the
private enforcement of directors' duties by shareholders. For
example, along with France and Japan, in the United States, if a
"demand requirement" is made that the company raise legal
proceedings against the miscreant directors and the company fails to
do so, a shareholder then has the right to raise a derivative action on
behalf of the company against those directors. This can be contrasted
with the more stringent preconditions applied in the context of a
derivative action in Spain and Finland, where a shareholder must
hold a minimum of five and ten per cent of the shares of the company
respectively; it is likewise more stringent in the United Kingdom,
where the courts apply statutory pre-hearing criteria in a manner
which is generally hostile to the continuation of derivative
litigation. 123
But it is also plausible to address the protection of shareholders
at an aggregate level. The empirical literature on corporate law
frequently uses such aggregates.1 24 There has also been recent
theoretical support for the use of aggregates and other composite
indicators. This is based on a "bundle perspective to comparative
corporate governance" since a particular mechanism often depends
on, or may be substituted, by other questions of corporate
governance.125 Thus, despite its limitations, there is some
justification to interpret the levels of protection at the aggregate
level, as displayed in Table 5.
Here, the relatively low level of shareholder protection in U.S.
law raises doubts about the legal origins "story," namely the
argument that the comparatively robust shareholder protection of
common law countries has led to more dispersed shareholder
122. See Mathias Siems, Private Enforcement of Directors' Duties: Derivative
Actions as a Global Phenomenon, in COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: ENHANCING ACCESS TO
JUSTICE AND RECONCILING MULTILAYER INTERESTS? 93 (Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van
Uytsel & Mathias Siems eds., 2012).
123. For further details, see COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED
APPROACH, supra note 9, ch. 10.
124. See, e.g., the La Porta et al. and Armour et al. studies, supra notes 8, 30, 49.
125. Gerhard Schnyder, Measuring Corporate Governance: Lessons From the
'Bundles Approach', Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working
Paper No. 438 (2012), available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WPfourthreeeight
.pdf, following Ruth V. Aguilera, Kurt A. Desender & Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de
Castro, A Bundle Perspective to Comparative Corporate Governance, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 380 (Thomas Clarke ed., 2012).
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ownership and more developed capital markets.126 Additional
evidence against the validity of the legal origins theorem is furnished
by the observations drawn from four of our case studies insofar as
they establish that (i) there are no major substantive differences in
the degree to which shareholders are protected by the directors' duty
of care, skill, and loyalty; (ii) no major deviation between the United
Kingdom (as a common law country) and the civilian jurisdictions is
detectable in relation to the degree to which shareholders benefit
from the right to ask questions, challenge a shareholders' resolution,
and/or block a merger owing to the occurrence of a procedural defect
in the conduct of a general meeting; and (iii) each of the jurisdictions
examined has mechanisms which enable minority shareholders to
enforce a breach of directors' duties, ranging from a mixture of
derivative actions, personal actions, and the hybrid actio pro socio.127
In Table 5, the United Kingdom performs well in the general
category of shareholder protection; nevertheless, it shares
commonalities with the United States (as well as Japan) insofar as
the U.K. courts are generally more hostile to legal proceedings raised
by the minority against the majority than are the courts of the
continental European countries. For example, unlike the United
Kingdom, our findings appear to indicate that civilian jurisdictions
such as Spain, Poland, Germany, Latvia, and Italy are receptive to
minority shareholder claims against the majority and, indeed, in
certain civilian jurisdictions, the law imposes fiduciary duties on the
controlling or majority shareholders which are owed to the
minority. 128 This can be explained by the relatively concentrated
ownership structures of continental European companies, leading to
the risk that the dominant shareholder exploits the minority. In the
United Kingdom and the United States, shareholder ownership is
more dispersed and therefore there may be less need to interfere with
the principle of majority rule. Hence, there is indeed some evidence
for the proposition that certain civil law systems appear to prioritize
the eradication or minimization of horizontal agency costs more than
common law jurisdictions by placing greater emphasis on duties owed
by controlling shareholders to minority shareholders. 129 However,
this does not translate into a greater variety or number of
enforcement mechanisms than common law jurisdictions, since all of
126. See supra Part I.C.
127. For further details, see COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED
APPROACH, supra note 9, chs. 2, 4, 9-10.
128. For example, Germany, Poland, and Latvia. Although the United Kingdom
does not recognize the notion that majority or controlling shareholders owe fiduciary
duties to the minority shareholders, the "unfair prejudice" remedy and the statutory
derivative claim (respectively, §§ 994 and 260-69 of the Companies Act, 2006, c. 46)
operate as functional equivalents.
129. See also supra Part I.B.
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the jurisdictions surveyed contain means by which minority
shareholders can seek redress against wrongdoing directors. 130
The remaining two categories of Table 5 have to be interpreted
cautiously. Creditor protection seems to be stronger in most civil law
countries than in the United Kingdom and the United States, which
may reflect that in the former countries, bank finance is more
important than market finance. Indeed, the findings from our case on
"veil piercing" and related topics suggest that French and Japanese
law are the most pro-creditor and the United States the least. 13 '
However, since this category is based only on three variables, the
results should not be overinterpreted, and it should also be stressed
that the second case study on creditor protection revealed that
creditors in all of the jurisdictions are protected by a diverse
assortment of rules or doctrines, ranging from capital maintenance
rules, rules regulating the payment of dividends, directors' duties,
the "piercing the corporate veil" doctrine, and fraudulent conveyance
laws. 132
Finally, it is difficult to adduce why in a particular jurisdiction
there were more "unclear" results indicated by the national reporters
than in others. However, it may make sense that in U.K. corporate
law there are no unclear results, reflecting its long history of
codification and case law. Another factor is that in some jurisdictions
a fact-specific situation or legal issue may not have been addressed in
statute, a commercial code, or case law. As such, the absence of a
default rule may be unsurprising, particularly in the newly acceded
EU states included in the study.
As in the previous sections, the data can be transformed into a
difference matrix, available in the online supplement, 33 which is
then used to produce a new network picture, Figure 3. It can be seen
that the legal systems from continental Europe all feature in one half
of Figure 3. In particular, Germany, Poland, and Latvia are relatively
close since they have slightly lower shareholder protection but all
score well in the creditor protection variable (see Table 5). Italy and
Spain are also very close to each other. The other three countries are
relatively different from this continental group. This also includes
the United Kingdom, reflecting the differences in minority
shareholder protection (see Table 5). Interestingly, the United States
is relatively close to Japan but not to the United Kingdom.
Finally, as in the previous sections, we calculated the division
into clusters. The best "fit" is achieved with two clusters. 3 4 As
130. See COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH, supra note 9, ch.
10.
131. Id. ch. 6.
132. Id. ch. 7.
133. See Cabrelli & Siems, supra note 81.
134. The precise numbers are fit -0.765 and r-square 0.584.
[Vol. 63
20151 CONVERGENCE, LEGAL ORIGINS, AND TRANSPLANTS
FIGURE 3: NETWORK BASED ON SIMILARITY OF RESULTS
(WITH TWO CLUSTERS)
UK Poland
Germany
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-I'OFrance
illustrated by the colors of the network in Figure 3, we see the group
of continental European countries, with the other cluster comprising
the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan.
E. The Relationship between Legal Rules, Sources of Law, and
Results
Since the three "difference matrices" use the same measure
(namely, how different each of the countries is from the others), they
are useful tools for a combined analysis of legal rules, sources of law,
and results. To start with, one can simply sum up the data and iden-
tify which pairs of countries are most similar. When the pairs are
ranked, the result of this operation is that Latvia, Poland, Finland,
Spain, and Italy are fairly similar since these countries share at least
three of the top ten links with each other. Germany and France each
have one of the top ten links, with Poland and Italy respectively. Fi-
nally, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan are at the
periphery with no close links.135
It may be a surprise to learn that none of the "main" legal sys-
tems is at the center. Yet this outcome is not implausible since
Latvia, Poland, Finland, Spain, and Italy have been influenced by the
135. The precise figures are (from 0-identical to 60-completely different):
LAT-POL 17.33, SPA-ITA 19.34, SPA-LAT 20.5, LAT-ITA 22.17, FRA-ITA 22.51,
SPA-POL 23.83, GER-POL 23.84, ITA-FIN 24.5, SPA-FIN 24.67, LAT-FIN 24.84.
For the country abbreviations, see supra note 85.
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"main" countries, thus explaining their relative similarity. Figures 1
to 3 also show this result since these same five countries are usually
at the center. It also confirms another quantitative study by one of
us, which found that with respect to creditor and shareholder protec-
tion in twenty-five countries, transplant countries were typically the
countries most similar to the other twenty-four. 136
In addition, it is interesting to examine the relationship between
these three categories. First, we calculated whether and how formal
rules, sources of law, and results are correlated (i.e. from -1 to 1). The
correlation between the sources of law and the other two categories is
positive yet relatively modest (0.37 and 0.42), but there is a strong
positive correlation between formal legal rules and results (0.84). Of
course correlation does not imply causation. Thus, secondly, we also
calculated the extent to which the differences in results are deter-
mined by the differences in formal rules and/or the sources of law.
The resulting regression shows that the legal rules are strongly sig-
nificant but the sources of law are not. 137
This regularity does not mean that the content of the legal rules
is automatically reflected in the results. This may be due on the one
hand to the fact that the positive law may be similar but applied dif-
ferently, for instance because a legal transplant does not work as well
as it does in the origin country ("transplant effect"). 138 On the other
hand, it may be suggested that even where the positive law is differ-
ent, the results may be similar since different legal rules can be
functional equivalents. 139
To assess this point, one may compare the mean differences of
the three categories. These are 57% for formal rules, 46% for sources
of law, and 50% for the results. Thus, considering the 7% gap be-
tween formal rules and results, it may follow that there are some
formal differences which functionally lead to the same result. How-
ever, a problem with this reasoning is that in our dataset, the
category results usually only had three options per component (e.g.
protecting shareholders, protecting directors, or "unclear"), whereas
136. Siems, supra note 89.
137. Rules: standardized coefficient 0.8088; significance 0.000. Sources of law:
standardized coefficient 0.0956; significance 0.256. The r-square is 0.7111. The rele-
vant regression method for network data is called "QAP via full partialling." See
HANNEMAN & RIDDLE, supra note 89, ch. 18.
138. For the latter point, see, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-
Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003); TT Arvind,
The "Transplant Effect" in Harmonization, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 65 (2010). See also
supra Part I.D.
139. This is a frequent claim of comparative lawyers; see, e.g., Basil Markesinis,
The Destructive and Constructive Role of the Comparative Lawyer, 57 RABELS ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FCiR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRVATRECHT 438, 443 (1993) ("we
must try to overcome obstacles of terminology and classification in order to show that
foreign law is not very different from ours but only appears to be so").
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there were more options in the formal rules category.140 Conse-
quently, this feature of the dataset may be the main reason why
there appear to be more differences in terms of formal rules.
A more suitable method for establishing the relationship be-
tween formal rules and results is to examine selected pairs of
countries. This has been done in Table 6.
TABLE 6: DIFFERENCES FROM MEAN FOR SELECTED
PAIRS OF COUNTRIES
GER-LAT US-JP UK-FRA UK-GER UK-US
Legal rules -1.38 -1.38 0.62 1.62 -0.38
Sources of law 2.37 -0.46 -2.29 -0.29 -1.13
Results -4.93 -2.93 1.07 2.07 0.07
The table is to be read as follows: each column displays how similar
the indicated countries' laws are in the three categories. The point of
comparison is the mean of the category in question. Thus, the
negative number of -1.38 in the GER-LAT column indicates that
Germany and Latvia are closer than average in terms of legal rules,
while the number 2.37 means that with respect to the sources of law,
Germany and Latvia are relatively different, as compared to the
average. 141
One might expect that Germany and Latvia, as well as the
United States and Japan, have relatively similar formal rules since
Latvia borrowed some of its corporate law from Germany, and Japan
did the same from the United States. But perhaps these legal
transplants did not come to function in the same way as in their
original jurisdictions, as they became shaped by the socio-economic,
political, and cultural context of the host jurisdictions. 142 Conversely,
one may expect that the relationship between the United Kingdom on
the one hand and France and Germany on the other shows functional
equivalence; due to their different legal traditions, they may have
different legal rules, but the results could nonetheless be relatively
similar.
Table 6, however, does not confirm these points. The country
pairs of Germany-Latvia and the United States-Japan are closer in
their results than in their legal rules, and the United Kingdom is
more different than both France and Germany with respect to results
than with respect to legal rules. It may also be surprising that, in
terms of sources of law, the United Kingdom and France are even
140. See generally supra Part II.D.
141. This is due to the fact that case law and academic writings are more
important in Germany; see supra Part III.C.
142. See supra Part I.D.
2015] 149
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
closer than the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus, the
general theories of comparative law do not seem to hold in the context
of corporate law. This sounds like a negative conclusion, possibly also
due to the limitations of the present approach. 143 However, it may
also be put in a more positive light, namely that there is no support
for the proposition that transplanted laws cannot work as well as
non-transplanted ones.' 44
A final point that can be examined is whether case law generates
more different results than other sources of law, in particular statute
law. Thus, first, the mean differences of the three categories were
recalculated, focusing on the solutions that refer to case law. Here,
the difference between formal rules is 43% (compared to 57% for all
sources of law) and between the actual results is 53% (compared to
50% for all sources of law). This is not necessarily surprising. Topics
where case law is important, such as directors' duties, may have legal
rules that are fairly similar across countries. However, differences in
the results may be more pronounced since courts are keen to apply
these rules to the specific socio-economic context of the country in
question.
Second, a recalculation was performed to determine whether
courts have a greater tendency than legislatures to protect
shareholders. The background to this question is that some have
argued that the common law countries are better at protecting
shareholders since their courts are more alive to the protection of
property rights, whereas legislatures more often pursue other aims,
such as the redistribution of resources. 145 The data we have collected
shows that 46% of the solutions with case law favor shareholder
protection, whereas the figure falls to 42% in the case of all sources of
law. Thus, there is (only) a slight difference.
Moreover, one can calculate which countries drive this result.
For this purpose, the focus should be on France, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, since only in these five
countries were the national reporters' solutions based on case law to
a considerable extent.146 The results show that in France and
Germany, court involvement is associated with an increase in
shareholder protection, whereas in the other three countries, the
tendency to protect shareholders is unaffected by the question of
143. See supra Part III.A.
144. It may even be possible that sometimes they work better than in the country
of origin. See Mathias Siems, The Curious Case of Overfitting Legal Transplants, in
THE METHOD AND CULTURE OF COMPARATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARK VAN
HOECKE 133 (Maurice Adams & Dirk Heirbaut eds., 2014).
145. See, e.g., Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Financial
Development, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 251 (Claude Menard &
Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005).
146. See supra Part III.C.
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whether case law is relevant for one of the solutions. 147 Thus,
according to our data, common law courts do not appear to be
especially interested in the protection of shareholders.
The findings of this Part also have implications for the debate
about harmonization in corporate law and the counterargument that
it can only lead to formal harmonization and fails to respond to the
need for functionally equivalent legal rules. Yet, our results do not
confirm such skepticism. It was not possible to confirm functional
similarity with formal dissimilarity (or formal similarity with
function dissimilarity), which also means that it was not possible to
find a "transplant effect" in countries that have been influenced by
foreign legal rules. In addition, there is a strong positive correlation
between the content of legal rules and the actual results: thus, formal
harmonization can work insofar as law-makers possess a willingness
to achieve common standards, for instance in the protection of
shareholders or creditors.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this Article, we have shown how a case-based approach can
contribute to comparative corporate law, by informing our under-
standing of the extent to which the legal systems explored have
fundamentally similar corporate law rules and sources of corporate
law, as well as the nature of the results reached on the application of
such rules. The study was based on ten cases used in a wider re-
search project 148 and their solutions in ten countries: eight European
countries, the United States, and Japan. It may be suggested that
further countries, for example from emerging economies or the devel-
oping world, should also have been included. Yet such an inclusion
may have also been contentious, since the present comparison of mar-
ket economies of the developed world has the advantage that it can
assess the remaining differences against a baseline of similarity in
terms of the countries' histories, societies, economies, and ideolo-
gies. 149 For example, if we had included a country such as China, a
number of further considerations may have needed to be considered,
such as the role of state ownership in corporate governance and the
independence of the courts.
Yet, even limited to the countries discussed here, the following
conclusions can be drawn from our findings. The first is that it is not
147. The precise numbers are ("all observations"; "case law only"): Germany (0.38;
0.50), France (0.46; 0.61), the UK (0.53; 0.50), the US (0.23; 0.25), and Japan (0.46;
0.45).
148. COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAw: A CASE-BASED APPROACH, supra note 9.
149. For a similar line of reasoning, see Mark Warrington & Mark Van Hoecke,
Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Com-
parative Law, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 495, 533 (1998); Neil J. Smelser, COMPARATIVE
METHODS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 66 (1976).
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possible to confirm a global convergence, in particular a general
Americanization, of corporate laws. According to our data, there is
some evidence of legal transplants, for example as regards the rela-
tionship of Japanese to U.S. corporate law. Yet, overall, in all three
categories-legal rules, sources of law, and results-the United
States is the outlier. Hence, we do not find evidence for Hansmann
and Kraakman's view of "an end of history for corporate law" with the
modem U.S. model of corporate law having won the day.150 Moreo-
ver, it would appear that both the United States and Japan are
relatively different from the European countries of the study, thus
raising some doubts about a global convergence of corporate laws.
Secondly, the question of Europeanization of corporate law is
more difficult to answer. There is some evidence that EU Directives
have led to some convergence of corporate laws. Still, the U.K. system
of corporate law is a bit of an outlier in terms of the nature of the
rules, the sources of those rules, and the outcome reached when such
rules are applied. Moreover, it is remarkable that even the continen-
tal European countries differ considerably. For instance, while the
two Eastern European countries of our study (Latvia and Poland)
have transplanted some rules from other legal systems, there are still
notable differences in the underlying sources of law, in particular in
the role played by case law. There are also differences remaining in
the protection of shareholders, even within continental Europe, with
Spain providing less protection than the other civil law countries.
Thus, while there is some evidence for the convergence of legal sys-
tems, even in a relatively homogeneous region such as the EU, there
is no "end of history for corporate law."
Thirdly, one should be skeptical about the role of legal families.
There are some similarities between the United Kingdom and the
United States in terms of sources of law, yet case law also plays an
important role in Germany, France, and Japan. One of our findings
shows that, possibly due to their more concentrated ownership struc-
tures, the civil law countries of continental Europe provide stronger
protection for minority shareholders against the majority than do the
United Kingdom and the United States. But, more generally, many of
the similarities and differences in legal rules and actual results do
not align with the categories of legal families. More specifically, the
findings do not confirm the hypothesis that the case law of common
law countries is a crucial determinant for their high levels of share-
holder protection; rather, if case law has an influence on shareholder
protection, according to our data, this appears to be most pronounced
in France and Germany.
All of this also leads to the rejection of the findings by La Porta et
al., who have claimed that the more robust shareholder protection of
150. See supra Parts I.B and III.D.
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the common law countries is crucial to their more dispersed share-
holder ownership and more developed capital markets. 151 As a
consequence, it also seems misconceived to make the policy claim
that a high level of shareholder protection (or perhaps particular
types of legal rules) is essential for capital market development.
151. See supra Part I.C.
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